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Public Executions: Understanding the
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments"
Clause
By STEVEN A. BLUM*
Introduction
This Article analyzes public executions, which currently occur in
certain states and which have been seriously proposed in others, includ-
ing California. Part I addresses the status of public executions in the
United States. It first summarizes the present-day existence of, and sym-
pathy for, public executions, and then briefly reviews the history of pub-
lic executions, particularly noting their effect on the African-American
community. Part II focuses on the function of public executions as a
political tactic in totalitarian (specifically fascistic) regimes during the
twentieth century. This part notes that fascist governments operate by
the rational employment of irrational spectacle, including the use of sa-
distic public violence (such as public execution), as a crucible for accret-
ing illegitimate power. Part III analyzes a constitutional response to the
function and effects of public executions, employing the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The history of the Eighth Amendment reveals that it oper-
ates not so much to protect the rights of the punished but to regulate the
activity of the punisher. This part presents an understanding of the
Eighth Amendment's place in a constitutional structure that provides for
government by rational discourse rather than by phantasm or the use of
spectacles that appeal to sadistic and other irrational but popular urges.
I. Public Executions in the United States
A. Public Executions Today
Norman Mailer tells the story of a man who met his death on Janu-
ary 17, 1977. Convicted murderer Gary Gilmore had refused to appeal
* Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, Los Angeles, California; J.D., Yale Law School,
1987; B.A., summa cum laude, University of California, 1984. The author is indebted to Owen
Fiss, Henry Schwarzschild, Burke Marshall, Charles L. Black, Jr.; and Robert Burt.
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his Utah death sentence and fell to the nation's first execution in a dec-
ade.1 And so we read:
Ron Stanger's first impression was how many people were in the
room. God, the number of spectators. Executions must be a spec-
tator sport.... [T]here was Gary staring at the crowd with an odd
humor in his face. Stanger knew what he was thinking. "Anybody
who knows somebody is going to get an invite to the turkey shoot."
[Bob] Moody also felt anger at all the people who had been
invited. [Warden] Sam Smith had given them such fuss whether it
would be five or seven guests. Now there were all these needless
people pressed behind the line, and the executioners back of the
screen talking. You couldn't hear what they were saying, but you
could hear them, and it incensed Bob that Ernie Wright, Director
of Corrections, was dancing around greeting people, practically
gallivanting with his big white cowboy hat, looking like a Texas
bureaucrat.
Cline Campbell's first thought when he walked into the room
was, "My goodness, do they sell tickets to this?"2
Gilmore's execution could be carried out, before some forty spectators,
only after the state prison's warden had consulted a list of volunteers to
staff the firing squad. In fact, a number of citizens had called the prison
at Draper shortly before the execution, and the newspapers reported:
The callers, more than two dozen of them, were volunteering to
shoot [Gilmore] outside the prison gates five days from now. Their
names have been added to a file of volunteers that has been untap-
ped since the last execution was held in Utah 16 years ago.
Now, suddenly, Warden Smith today began a review of the
list, conscious of the burden of selecting five volunteers who can
assume the burden of dispassionately meting out an act of Capital
punishment ....
The warden today said that he would draw the names from
the list of volunteers after he had screened those who sought par-
ticipation for "unhealthy" reasons.
"I can't judge everyone's motive," he said, "and I'm not sure
what criteria I should use in evaluation. I'm just looking for solid
citizens."3
1. This Article accepts, arguendo, the legal premise that executions per se are constitu-
tionally permissible. Such acceptance is only the beginning of the analysis.
2. NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG 980-81 (1979).
3. Jon Nordheimer, 2 Dozen Ask to Join Firing Squad; Warden Tells of Utah Volunteers,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1976, at 14.
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Warden Smith chose five solid citizens who wanted to kill Gary Gilmore
at Draper, Utah.4
In recent years, Florida has had one of the largest death row popula-
tions in the nation.' Its executions proceed regularly and there is a wait-
ing list of citizens asking to see condemned men die. The Department of
Corrections selects twelve witnesses from a volunteer list to watch each
execution alongside clergy, medical personnel, the prisoner's attorneys,
and state officials. Currently, there are no policies or guidelines for wit-
ness selection, and declared motives for wanting to see an execution
vary.
6
Officials in Florida and Utah can thus carry out public executions;
that is, executions that members of the general public may voluntarily
attend.7 (This Article does not, however, define an execution as "public"
merely because the state asks a very limited number of randomly selected
passive citizens to agree to witness the event to assure executive
accountability.)8
4. The Utah firing squad, adopted in 1851, is meant to effectuate the Mormon doctrine
of blood atonement. See generally Martin R. Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation as a Suffi-
cient Condition for Unconstitutionality Under the Establishment Clause-A Case for Considera-
tion: The Utah Firing Squad, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 442 (noting that "[tihe doctrine of
blood atonement posits that some sins, primarily murder, are so heinous that the atoning sacri-
fice of Christ is unavailing as an expiation of the sin of the offender").
5. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A., Jan. 21,
1991, at 11, 15, 31 (indicating that Texas has the largest death row population (332), with
Florida (298) and California (296) close behind).
6. In Florida, A Waiting List to Watch Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1986, § 1, at 33;
Telephone interview with Kerry Flack, Florida Dept. of Corrections of Tallahassee, Fla. (Feb.
12, 1987).
7. Negley Teeters suggests a similar definition. See infra note 20. Compulsory attend-
ance, it should be noted, would probably violate the potential witness' right to privacy. Cf
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (right to be free of certain bodily intrusions); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 470 (1965) (women's right to bodily integrity). Even state and
federal prison guards cannot be required to perform any duties in furtherance of a federal
execution. 21 U.S.C. § 848(r) (1988).
8. This definition of public execution encompasses the morally reprehensible aspect of
the event: manifesting the desire to see another human being killed. At the same time, this
definition does not deny a requirement of the executioner's public accountability. Under gov-
ernance by separation of powers, the executioner must be accountable to the people to prevent
abuses. Accountability could be achieved by legislative oversight or perhaps even by newspa-
per reporters, rather than by the public directly.
One can imagine the volunteer witness anticipating a perverse cathartic charge from the
execution. By contrast, one can imagine the randomly drafted witness anticipating a solemn,
but legally necessary, public task. Public executions have been opposed for other reasons, both
normative and positive. In the home of Benjamin Franklin, Dr. Benjamin Rush considered the
problems arising when publicity disturbs the solemnity and quiet disgrace that should charac-
terize an execution. Rush reports that during the Revolutionary War, Major Andre told his
executioners, "I call upon you to bear witness, gentlemen, that I die like a brave man." Dr.
Rush notes that "[t]he spy was lost in the hero; and indignation, everywhere, gave way to
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Florida and Utah are not the only states with serious advocates of
public execution. In Texas, Roger "Animal" DeGarmo announced that
he would auction seats for witnesses to his planned 1986 execution, and
he claimed to receive two $1,500 bids and five $1,000 bids. Texas De-
partment of Correction officials refused to allow the sales.9 The State's
Attorney General, however, subsequently agreed that "cameras should
be allowed in the death chamber so the public could see how a criminal is
put to death."10 Less than a decade earlier, the Fifth Circuit had rejected
a Texas television news cameraman's claim asserting a right to record the
State's first execution since 1964 on film for later showing on television
news. Although Texas allowed full access to the event by reporters, it
denied recording by mechanical means, and the court upheld the Texas
policy on the grounds that the First Amendment does not extend to gov-
ernment functions not accessible to the public generally.11 The court rea-
soned that meeting the reporters' request would amount to conducting a
public execution, and noted that in 1890, the Supreme Court upheld the
right of a state to restrict attendance at executions. 2
In 1991, San Francisco's public television station KQED sued the
warden of San Quentin State Prison to compel him to permit the video-
taping of an execution by a television camera crew. The court rejected
the station's argument that First Amendment freedom of speech con-
cerns outweighed the State's interest in securing order by statutorily im-
posing limits on the types of persons who may attend public executions.
13
The court held that the warden's decision to exclude the television crew
was not irrational, unreasonable, and capricious.'
4
admiration and praise. But this is not all-the admiration which fortitude, under suffering,
excites, has in some cases excited envy." BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS
OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON CRIMINALS AND UPON SOCIETY 4 (1787).
9. Texas Slayer Executed; Second Killer Wins Stay, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 13, 1986, at 5.
10. Top Official on Death Row Fears Texas is Shrugging Off Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 1987, at A21.
11. Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977).
12. Id at 1280 (citing Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 491 (1890)). Members of the
public have no inherent right to participate in the criminal justice process. See generally JOAN
E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3-43 (1980). Nonethe-
less, South Carolina permits four witnesses to attend an execution, including one who "may be
designated by the family of the victim." SOUTH CAROLINA DErr. OF CORRECTIONS, EXEcU-
TION PROCEDURES 4 (Feb. 5, 1980) (on file with author).
13. See CAL PENAL CODE § 3605 (Deering Supp. 1991).
14. KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS (N.D. Cal. June 7, 1991) (oral opinion)
(on file with author). To the contrary, the court held, "[W]hatever exclusions are appropriate
for a public hearing such as a court trial, ought to be more compelling than those that are
needed to exclude them from a private execution." The court agreed with the warden's argu-
ments that "the prison population becomes extremely tense, hostile and aggressive during the
period surrounding any planned or actual execution." Security becomes a concern, and secur-
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Sentiment favoring public displays of state-imposed death and vio-
lence continues in other forms. 5 For example, when James D. Rauler-
son was executed in 1985 for killing a policeman during a 1975 robbery,
police officers stood near the execution site in Starke, Florida, "some
wearing T-shirts with a drawing of the electric chair and the words
'Crank up Old Sparky,' [and] cheered and clapped when word of the
execution reached them." 6 Two weeks earlier, when Joseph Shaw was
electrocuted in South Carolina, "[a]bout 75 supporters of the death pen-
alty stood outside the prison and cheered when they learned the execu-
tion had been carried out. One carried a sign reading 'Burn, baby,
burn.' 17 And when South Carolina put James Roach to death one year
later, the New York Times reported, "When Mr. Roach's death was an-
nounced this morning, cheers came from a crowd of more than 200 peo-
ity "has to be left to the people who are responsible for dealing with the problems that arise if
security is breached. .. ." The warden is "really not required to trust anybody [and] it's no
answer to say that press representatives are all nice people and that they never can do anything
irregular or irrational." Id
The court also noted that a heavy object, such as a camera, could strike a glass-enclosed
sealed gas chamber when it is filled with lethal gas, resulting in a leak of gas into the witness
area. Moreover, prison personnel may want their identities concealed to prevent retaliation
from other prisoners or their associates, gangs, or any element of the public that might be
"hysterically offended by the fact of the execution." Finally, there was concern that "circula-
tion of a photograph of an execution within the prison even after the time of the execution, and
more seriously, the display on television of a live broadcast of the event within the prison,
could spark severe prisoner reaction that might be dangerous to the safety of prison person-
nel." Id
15. A 1976 national survey asked the following question: "If they go back to executing
people convicted of murder, would you favor or oppose putting such executions on television?"
Eleven percent of respondents were in favor; eighty-six percent were opposed; and three per-
cent were unsure. Cm. TRm., Jan. 13, 1977 (Harris Survey). See also TV GUIDE, Oct. 3-9,
1987, at 31:
MPI [Home Video Company] has made millions through sales of its "Faces of
Death" videocassettes: grisly footage of executions, autopsies and other mayhem.
The company has withdrawn distribution of the tapes, but not through any sudden
attack of good taste. It's just that all the negative press that's been pouring in is
giving MPI a bad name. Company president Waleed Ali has reportedly said: "I
don't apologize for it.... I'm very proud of its sales."
16. .4 Cop Killer Dies in Chair, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 30, 1985, at A3.
17. South Carolina Marks Its First Execution in Over Two Decades, L.A. DAILY J., Jan.
14, 1985, at 3. "And while Shaw died, the TV crews recorded another 'curiosity' of the death
penalty-the crowd gathered outside the death house to cheer on the executioner. Whoops of
elation greeted the announcement of Shaw's death. Waiting at the penitentiary gates for the
appearance of the hearse bearing Shaw's remains, one demonstrator started yelling, 'Where's
the beef?"' David Bruck, NEw REPUBLIC, May 20, 1985, at 20. ("Where's the beef?" is a
phrase taken from a well-known television commercial for Wendy's hamburgers; Walter
Mondale used the phrase in his 1980 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination,
implying that there was no substance to fellow Democrat Gary Hart's campaign.)
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ple, some carrying signs with messages like 'Let the juice flow.' ,,1s
B. Public Executions in American History
Vestiges of public hangings remain even though England abolished
public executions in 1868,19 and the American states began to restrict or
abolish them in the 1830s.20 The history of such public executions shows
their intended effect was hardly commendable. As early as 1834, New
York considered a bill to end "the vicious assemblages and demoralizing
tendencies of public executions,"21 but the statutes of several states main-
tained exceptions giving the sentencing court discretion to order public
execution for particular crimes such as rape.22 Only when state govern-
ments took control of executions from county sheriffs was this discretion
at all curtailed,23 because the states could then execute prisoners behind
penitentiary walls.24
One of the principal effects of these discretionary public executions
was to promote racial terror. Black men were often publicly hanged in
the South after having been convicted of capital crimes, particularly rap-
18. South Carolina Executes Killer: Age Stirs Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1986, § 1, at
B6.
19. The Capital Punishment Amendment Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 24, reprinted in 4
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 642 (1929). See generally DAVID D. COOPER, THE
LESSON OF THE SCAFFOLD: THE PUBLIC EXECUTION CONTROVERSY IN VICTORIAN ENG-
LAND (1974).
20. Negley Teeters asserts that the traditional distinction between a private execution and
a public execution is moot. Executions today, he suggests, "may be too public to suit some
people. Objections have been lodged against too many witnesses, reporters, spectators invited
by the wardens or sheriffs." He cites the example of Elizabeth Ann "Ma" Duncan, who was
gassed to death at San Quentin on August 8, 1962. Some 57 persons "clustered around the
glass-enclosed capsule to see the woman gasp her way into eternity." NEGLEY K. TEETERS,
HANG BY THE NECK 7 (1967).
21. PHILIP E. MACKEY, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE, 1776-1861, at 116 (1982).
22. G. Mark Mamantov, Note, The Executioner's Song: Is There a Right to Listen, 69 VA.
L. REV. 373, 377 (1983) (arguing in favor of press access to executions under the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech).
23. Id. Shortly before New York passed its private execution statute in 1835, a state
senator unsuccessfully tried to convince the sheriff of Saratoga County to order a private exe-
cution. "The sheriff said that such an order 'would draw down upon him, the ill will of the
multitude of grocers and tavern keepers and merchants who always anticipate great profits
from these executions.'" MACKEY, supra note 21, at 118.
24. The last traditional public hanging under state law probably occurred in 1936 in Ow-
ensboro, Kentucky, before some 10,000 witnesses. 10,000 See Hanging of Kentucky Negro,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1936, at 30. Teeters reports: "The last public hanging (legal) in the
United States took place in Owensboro .... when a twenty-two-year-old Negro named Ram-
sey Bethea was executed before an estimated crowd of 20,000 for criminally assaulting a sev-
enty-year-old woman." TEETERS, supra note 20, at 6. The discrepancy between the NY
Times and the Teeters estimates is unresolved.
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ing white women.2" At the same time, few whites were publicly hanged
in the region for any crimes.26 This practice reinforced a system of racial
6ppression dating from antebellum times, when slaves' servitude was en-
forced not only by state law, but also by the fear generated by public
punishment of those who attempted to escape.27
In the 1890s, after private execution statutes were in place in nearly
all the states, eighty-two percent of the nation's lynchings of black men
took place in fourteen Southern states. In the three decades from 1889 to
1918, that proportion increased to eighty-eight percent. According to
Joel Williamson,
The sudden and dramatic rise in the lynching of black men in and
after 1889 stands out like some giant volcanic eruption on the land-
scape of Southern race relations. There was indeed something new
and horribly palpable on the earth. It was signalized by the mob,
the rushing, swelling fury of a mass of struggling men, the bloody
and mangled bodies, and the smell of burning flesh....
In the nation ... from 1889 to 1899, on the average, one per-
son was lynched every other day, and two out of three were black.
In the first decade of the twentieth century, a person was lynched
approximately every fourth day, and nine out of ten were black, a
ratio of black over white that held into the 1930s. In the second
decade, one person was lynched every five days, and in the third,
one very [sic] nine days. In the 1930s lynching declined signifi-
cantly. Still, between 1889 and 1946, a year widely accepted as
marking the end of the era of lynching, almost 4,000 black[s]...
had been mobbed to their death.28
25. Petitioner Lucious Jackson, whose brief was before the Furman Court, advised that as
of 1968,
[t]he racial figures for all men executed in the United States for the crime of rape
since 1930 are as follows: 48 white, 405 Negro, 2 other. In Georgia, the figures are:
3 white, 58 Negro. These figures are also clearly not accidental. In Appendix B to
this brief, we trace the history of the punishment for rape in Georgia since the days of
slavery. Briefly stated, prior to the Civil War rape committed by a white man was
never regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant a penalty greater than 20 years im-
prisonment. Rape committed by a slave or a free person of color upon a white wo-
man was punishable by death. One year after the abolition of slavery, a facially
color-blind statute was enacted, giving juries discretion to sentence any man con-
victed of rape to either death or not more than 20 years imprisonment. It was not
until 1960 that the third option of life imprisonment was added to these two alterna-
tives. The objects of the alternatives have been perfectly obvious to Georgia juries,
and should be no less obvious to any observer.
Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Jackson v. Georgia, 405 U.S. 912 (1972) (No. 69-5030) (footnotes
omitted).
26. Id.
27. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977).
28. JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 117-18 (1984) (footnote omitted). "Between 1885
and 1907 there were more persons lynched in the United States than were legally executed, and
in the year 1892 twice as many." Id. at 185.
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Lynching often had the color, if not the imprimatur, of Southern
law. Indeed, it would be many years before Southerners as a whole
would acknowledge that lynching was a crime.29 One historian tells us:
Bodies were always left in plain sight for some time after death, a
deterrent to those who might be deterred. Fingers, toes, ears,
teeth, and bones were common souvenirs. A pro-lynching gover-
nor of South Carolina, Cole Blese, received the finger of a lynched
black in the mail and planted it in the gubernatorial garden. A
staunchly anti-lynching governor of Georgia in the early 1890s,
William J. Northern, frequently received pictures and fragments of
victims to remind him of where the power of life and death in that
state ultimately lay.
30
In 1891, Governor Benjamin Ryan Tillman of South Carolina con-
gratulated a sheriff who had saved a black prisoner from a lynch mob.
He proclaimed, though, "'There is only one crime that warrants lynch-
ing,'... 'and Governor as I am, I would lead a mob to lynch the negro
who ravishes a white woman.' ,31 When, in 1902, a young Emory Col-
lege classics professor named Sledd wrote in the Atlantic that lynchers
were murderers, he was forced to resign his post.32
Although an average of 127 blacks were lynched each year between
1889 and 1899, statistics do not tell the full story. Assuming a black
population of six million in 1889, the banal interpretation of the statistic
shows an average of 0.00002 lynchings per black per year, indicating that
about 99.998% of blacks were not lynched in 1899. Yet the statistics
become meaningless in relation to the act of lynching itself, which is a
form of social control that cannot be evaluated by simply dividing the
number of blacks lynched into the number not lynched. It is the absolute
number of lynchings in a given period, and whether that number rose or
fell later in time, that is important.
33
Since 1930, at least 3,859 persons have been legally executed; ap-
proximately 54.6% of those were black or members of other racial mi-
nority groups. Of the 455 executed for rape alone, 89.5% have been
nonwhite.34 Currently, about 43% of death row inmates are black.35 If
29. Id. at 117.
30. Id. at 188.
31. Id. at 133 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 259-61. Sledd's father-in-law, a former president of Emory, was able to arrange
an adjustment in the young man's pay, so that he could continue his graduate studies at Yale.
33. Id.
34. Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Racial Discrimination, Rape, and the Death Pen-
alty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 194 (Hugo A. Bedan ed., 3d ed. 1982).
35. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. I (Aug. 1, 1984) (un-
published compilation). As of 1986, three-quarters of Utah's condemned inmates were black,
yet black people constitute less than one percent of the state's population. Every person sen-
blacks are repeatedly subject to public execution more than whites,
whatever message emerges from this practice will be magnified in racial
terms, particularly when the historical circumstances of racial prejudice
are factored in. As the court in the case of "Negro Jack" put it in 1825,
the man convicted of rape and murder would be chained to a stake and
set afire so the community could "make of him a dreadful example to his
race."36 Symbolically at least, lynching has been perceived as an act
against the whole black community, not merely the execution of a single
"criminal." 3 7 As a result, public execution has been, and remains, a
visual statement of great social impact.
38
II. The Twentieth-Century Public Execution
as a Political Tactic
To appreciate the social impact of public violence, one must turn to
the years 1933 to 1945, which remain the contextual reference point for
tenced to death under the current Utah statute has been an impoverished male whose victim
was white. Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1269 (10th Cir. 1986).
36. TEETERS, supra note 20, at 109.
37. WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 187. On February 11, 1987, in Mobile, Alabama,
witnesses testifying in a $10 million lawsuit against the Ku Klux Klan said that Klan leader
Bennie Jack Hays had "called the sight of a black teenager's hanged body a 'pretty sight."'
The action charged members of the United Klans of America with killing the 19-year-old as
part of a pattern of racial intimidation inspired by the top leaders of the United Klans. The
victim, Michael Donald, "was beaten to death March 21, 1981, before his body was hanged in
a tree in Mobile across the street from apartments owned by Mr. Hays. Two people, including
Mr. Hays's son, were convicted in the slaying." Trial Ends in Alabama Suit Against the Klan,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1987, at A23.
In a recent Florida capital case, on motion of defense counsel, the original trial judge
recused himself before the penalty phase. After the guilt phase, the lawyers and the judge had
met in chambers to discuss the date when the penalty phase would begin. The judge had
commented either, "Since the nigger mom and dad are here anyway, why don't we go ahead
and do the penalty phase today instead of having to subpoena them back at cost to the state,"
or, "Since the niggers are here, maybe we can go ahead with the sentencing phase." (The
record is in conflict on this point.) Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986) (vacating
conviction and remanding for a new trial).
38. It has been widely noted that blacks are executed in disproportionate numbers. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Death penalty abolitionists
have made personal equal protection claims on behalf of condemned individuals. But this is
the wrong argument to make, since the easy response is that perhaps blacks commit more
capital crimes or are more often caught and convicted. The more valid argument is social:
when society punishes a black man, it sees more than the punishment of a man; it sees the
punishment of a black man. Such is the lot of any visible minority group in a society that has
not entirely purged itself of historical racism. The resulting image projected to blacks and to
society as a whole becomes one of terror against blacks. As we shall see, there is a solution to
this sort of problem, but it is not found in the equal protection claim of the condemned man.
Instead, it is found in the annals of history and in the Eighth Amendment's rule against
arbitrariness.
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contemporary Western political life. On one of the final days of that
period, April 28, 1945, the world rejoiced as Benito Mussolini's life was
extinguished. Ironically, the tyrant's death was consummated by the
same kind of political act, public violence, that the Fascists had used as
the crucible for their own power. After Mussolini and his mistress were
executed by an impulsive accountant named Audisio, a small band of
partisans put their bodies in a van and took them away. The following
morning, the removal van stopped in Piazzale Loreto and the bodies
were unloaded. This is what followed:
Two young men came up and kicked Mussolini repeatedly and sav-
agely on the jaw. When they left him his face was appallingly dis-
figured. His mouth was open and his upper lip pulled back from
his teeth so that he looked as if he were about to speak. Someone
put a stick in his hand and squeezed his fingers round it.
By nine o'clock a large crowd had gathered and the people in
it were shouting and jumping up and down to get a closer view.
Some of them were calling out obscenities and curses, or shooting
at the bodies with pistols and shot-guns; others were peering for-
ward silently with a kind of fascinated satisfaction or a pitying dis-
gust; a few were laughing hysterically. One woman fired five shots
into Mussolini's body to "avenge her five dead sons." The crowd
grew, and those in front were pushed forward so that they tram-
pled over the bodies, and the partisans guarding them fired over
the heads of the surging mass and then turned a hose on them in an
attempt to drive them back....
Ropes were found and tied round the corpse's ankles. Musso-
lini was pulled up first .... His face was the color of putty and
splashed with red stains, and his mouth was open still. The crowd
cheered wildly, and those in the front row spat at him and threw
what filth they could find.39
Thus was Mussolini's body exposed to public execration.
Sixteen other Fascist officials had been arrested the previous day.
The Committee for National Liberation had charged Audisio with the
task of executing them in the village of Dongo. Audisio accordingly de-
termined to shoot them in the town square. Dongo's Mayor Rubini pro-
tested, but Audisio indignantly replied, "Isn't this the way the Germans
behave? The execution is to be public, and it will be public."'  To no
avail the Mayor argued, "Yes, this is the way the Germans behave! But
we are Italians. We hate the Nazis just because of their barbarous meth-
ods."'" In the end, the sixteen Fascists were shot down in a wild hail of
bullets both by members of the firing squad and by every other armed
39. CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, IL DUCE: THE LIFE OF BENrrO MUSSOLINI 333-34 (1962).
40. ROMAN DOMBROWSKI, MUSSOLINI: TWILIGHT AND FALL 220 (1956).
41. Id at 221.
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man who was present. The Mayor told the partisans, "You have lost an
unusual, a unique, opportunity to begin a new period in our country's
history by applying principles of civilisation [sic]." 42
Contemporaneously, the German Einsatzgruppen, execution squads
that followed the Wehrmacht methodically to murder Jews, were carry-
ing out the majority of their killings in relative secrecy. Some executions
were carried out in the public squares, but the more workable techniques
were mass slaughters in isolated gravesites like Babi Yar and deportation
to hermetic ghettos and extermination camps.43 A thin veil of secrecy
and mystery was the most effective method for maintaining a govern-
ment of terror under the Nazi regime.' The method was particularly
effective in a regime where the normative basis for legality was dubious,
where a consistent moral semblance of public approval-indeed, where
any basis for government authority45-was not yet clearly established.
This brand of secrecy could be nicely complemented by selective in-
stances of conspicuously public terror.46
The Italian Fascists and the German Nazis formulated -their laws to
work in combination with credible threats of violence, effectuating power
in anti-democratic fashion.47 The Nazis amply used the method of legal-
ized public execution toward at least two ends. The first was to intimi-
date populations they did not want to destroy altogether. In particular,
public execution was an efficient means of reprisal against communities
in occupied countries where partisans resisted.4" Second, starting in
42. Id at 222.
43. See, ag., AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE, NAZI GERMANY'S WAR AGAINST THE
JEWS 1-43, 111-398 (1947).
44. E.K. BRAMSTEDT, DICTATORSHIP AND POLITICAL POLICE 176-80 (1945).
45. See KARL D. BRACHER, THE AGE OF IDEOLOGIES 45 (1984).
46. At a fundamental level there is no discontinuity between absolutely secret and abso-
lutely open killings. Humans fear that which they can never see, just as they fear that whose
sight they can never escape; the feeling persists that what K can never see might always be
watching K. Conceptually, the unknown and the omniscient are merged concepts because of
the limits on one's observational powers. (A convenient example of this merging is found in
the idea of God in the Western World.) In other words, when the self is isolated from others,
it is unable to interact and therefore is lost to the world; similarly, when the self is totally
merged with others, losing all semblance of self-identity, it is unable to interact and therefore is
lost to the world. This phenomenon has been put in psychoanalytic language by Erik Erikson,
who defines personal identity as "the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and con-
tinuity prepared in the past are matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for
others." ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261 (rev. 2d ed. 1963).
47. ARTHUR SCHWEITZER, THE AGE OF CHARISMA 91-93 (1984).
48. For example, Ukranian documents report that on October 4, 1942, a fire that probably
was caused by the negligence of stable-boys was the pretense for gathering all the male villag-
ers of Lubycza, a district of Rawa Ruska. When the villagers did not name two saboteurs
within two minutes, every fifth man was shot. Forty-six villagers were executed in front of
their relatives. A month later, another reprisal took place in the nearby towns of Czortkow
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1944, the Nazis applied a rule of "Lynch law" against downed and cap-
tured allied fliers suspected of attacking German civilian targets. Hang-
mngs were carried out locally by the German citizenry itself.4 9 The
principal objective was to deter prospective Allied pilots with careftilly
worded communiques conveying that, if captured, they too would be
punished by the people they had been bombing."0 Some Nazis feared the
nascent implication of either democracy or anarchy from these lynchings
because "[i]f the people are given a free hand to use Lynch law, it is hard
to establish rules!"51 However, the Reich Marshal's office was more cir-
cumspect when it declared: "We cannot control the reaction of the pop-
ulation [to the captured fliers] anyhow. But if possible the population
must be prevented from proceeding also against other enemy fliers [who
have not committed the particular acts deemed legally punishable by
Lynch law.]" 52
The Nazi public executions, then, reflected two significant features:
first, terror or deterrence, particularly in the occupied nations; second, an
appearance of debased democratic chaos in the German communities
where the downed fliers were killed. The Nazis eagerly sought to mani-
fest the first feature, but some in their ranks feared the second, with its
democratic import. The characteristic Nazi concern for rules partly ex-
and Lwow, where a German policeman had been shot. Eighty-four executions "were carried
out in broad day-light before the eyes of the frightened population." OFFICE OF UNITED
STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXiS CRIMINALITY, IV NAZI CONSPIR-
ACY AND AGGRESSION 89-90 (1946) [hereinafter NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION]. Sim-
ilarly, the Nazis in Northern Italy were ordered to respond to the partisans as follows:
"Wherever there is evidence of considerable numbers of partisans [sic] groups, a proportion of
the male population of the area will be arrested and in the event of an act of violence being
committed, these men will be shot. The population must be informed of this .... Perpetrators
or the ring leaders will be hanged in public." Order of General Kesselring, Bologna, 14 July
1944, in VIII NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, supra, at 581.
49. "That such lynchings actually took place has since been fully established in a series of
American Military Commission proceedings, which resulted in the conviction of German civil-
ians for the murder of Allied fliers." II NAzI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, supra note 48,
at 904.
50. Id. at 134-35.
51. VIII NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, supra note 48, at 132.
52. Id. at 138. The four enumerated acts punishable by lynching were:
1. Attacks on the civilian population (individual persons as well as gatherings)
by means of aircraft armament.
2. Shooting at our own (German) aircraft crews, who have been shot down
and are hanging from parachutes.
3. Attacks by means of air-craft armament on passenger trains serving public
traffic.
4. Attacks by means of aircraft armament on military or civilian hospitals and




plains this caution. 3 But because of some unexpressed calculus in the
mathematics of political terror, the highest Nazi officials could conclu-
sively endorse the public execution; those with a genius for such terror
recognized that their monopoly on violence allowed them to harness
completely the public execution, and the democratic feature became an
illusory phantasm. 4
M . The Historical Purposes of Public Executions
The Framers of the United States Constitution drew on the inherent
flaws in the European model as they built a constitutional society on the
liberal ideal of personal dignity rather than political terror. As a matter
of natural law, they felt the individual should be free from external power
and coercion over his will and conscience." The liberal conviction is
perhaps best understood by juxtaposing it against its historical antithesis,
totalitarian iniquity. This requires study of "punitive methods on the
basis of a political technology of the [human] body in which might be
read a common history of power relations and object relations. 5' 6 Our
53. See PETER LOEWENBERG, DECODING THE PAST 209-39 (1983); HARROLD LASS-
WELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 75-76 (1960).
54. Hitler's rise to power was occasioned by several important events, including those
surrounding the Reichstag fire of 1933. Six innocent men were blamed and finally beheaded on
November 29, 1933. Hitler and G6ring accused four others of complicity in the burning. In
1934, contemporaries reported the following:
Before an audience of S.A. men in the Berlin Sportpalast on the night of March 4th,
1933, their passions at fever pitch, raged Gdring: "If I had my way, we should have
set up the gallows on the very same night beside the Reichstag and then and there
should have hanged the Communist crooks!" More moderate in tone, Reich-
schancellor Hitler himself took advantage of the opening of the new Reichstag on
March 23rd to say: "Since certain sections of the foreign press have been seeking in
some way to identify this monstrous crime with the re-awakening of the German
nation, my own determination to avenge this sin in the shortest possible time by the
public execution of the incendiary and his accomplices has been greatly
strengthened."
WORLD COMMITTEE FOR THE RELIEF OF THE VICTIMS OF GERMAN FASCISM, THE REICHS-
TAG FIRE TRIAL: THE SECOND BROWN BOOK OF THE HITLER TERROR 10 (1934).
Present-day totalitarians have learned from this technique. Newspapers on January 22,
1986 report that in Beijing, 18 persons were convicted, sentenced to death, and executed before
a public rally of 13,000 people. China Holds Mass Execution as a New Year's Resolution, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 22, 1986, at 11. In China, over 40 offenses carry the death penalty, and people
have been executed for forming "a reactionary secret society," "exploiting feudal supersti-
tions," and holding "dance and sex parties." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER, May
1986. On February 17, 1987, Libya televised the execution of nine people. Three were shot by
firing squad, and six were hanged. RECAP Re" Capital Litigation, CALIFORNIA APPELLATE
PROJECT, June 1, 1987.
55. FRANz NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 69-95
(1957); see also ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 165-67 (1987).
56. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 24 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
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context, or nexus of situs (supra Part I) and time (supra Part II), is in-
complete without an understanding of function.
Punishment may be used to reaffirm the punisher's power. Such
political theorists as Rusche and Kirchheimer, Deleuze and Guattari,
Castell, and Foucault have each established the role of punishment as a
complex social function, regarding it as a political tactic ("not simply as
consequences of legislation or as indicators of social structures, but as
techniques possessing their own specificity in the more general field of
other ways of exercising power").57 In other words, punishment is not
merely the deprivation of a right, or a "negative mechanism" designed to
repress particular bad acts, but also a positive device intended to serve
the polity. Whipping in slave economies and contemporary community
service sentences for erring white-collar criminals are but two simple ex-
amples. The right to punish, an exercise of power, must be viewed "not
as a property, but as a strategy... ; one should decipher it in a network
of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that
one might possess; . . .one should take as its model a perpetual battle
rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a terri-
tory.""8 So viewed, power relationships and their symbol-punish-
ment-become more than the consequences of social compact; they are
the seal of the authority that preceded the compact.
In the eighteenth century, the European public execution served
four special judicial functions. First, it made the condemned man the
herald of his own condemnation, attesting to the truth drawn out by the
state's inquisitorial proceedings. Second, it established itself as a sort of
inquisitorial torture, when the condemned man with nothing to lose
could publicly name his accomplices. Third, it expressed poetic justice,
relating the barbarity of the punishment to the barbarity of the crime by
inflicting the crime on the condemned man. Finally, the public execu-
tion, in all its drama, served as the ultimate "proof" marked with un-
matched intensity, merging human judgment with the judgment of
God.59
The political functions of these public executions were even more
profound. The punished crime, it was thought, had attacked not only its
immediate victim, but also the sovereign personally. ° This approach to
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id at 26.
59. Id. at 43-47.
60. By 1775, the distinction between tort and crime was firmly established. Atcheson v.
Everett, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142 (K.B. 1775).
A tort is not the same thing as a crime, although the two sometimes have many
features in common. The distinction between them lies in the interests affected and
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crime remains with us today. Jurisprudes of the eighteenth century de-
termined that a law, "to be in force in this kingdom,... must necessarily
have emanated directly from the sovereign, or at least been confirmed by
the seal of his authority."61 Punishment therefore takes a pound of flesh
for the sovereign, who has rights of governance at stake. The sovereign
takes redress for the injury done to his or her kingdom, and for injury
done to his or her dignity. (Historically, in the United States, assaults on
the President have been treated with more gravity than assaults on an
ordinary citizen, for the sovereignty of the nation has been wounded.)62
Foucault analyzed the objectives of the eighteenth-century execution cer-
emony as follows:
The public execution, however hasty and everyday, belongs to a
whole series of great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored
(coronation, entry of the king into a conquered city, the submission
of rebellious subjects); over and above the crime that has placed
the sovereign in contempt, it deploys before all eyes an invincible
force. Its aim is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring
into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the sub-
ject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sover-
eign who displays his strength. Although redress of the private
injury occasioned by the offense must be proportionate, although
the sentence must be equitable, the punishment is carried out in
such a way as to give a spectacle not of measure, but of imbalance
and excess; in this liturgy of punishment, there must be an em-
phatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority. And
this superiority is not simply that of right, but that of the physical
strength of the sovereign beating down upon the body of his adver-
sary and mastering it; by breaking the law, the offender has
the remedy afforded by the law. A crime is an offense against the public at large, for
which the state, as the representative of the public, will bring proceedings in the form
of a criminal prosecution. The purpose of such a proceeding is to protect and vindi-
cate the interests of the public as a whole, by punishing the offender or eliminating
him from society, either permanently or for a limited time, by reforming him or
teaching him not to repeat the offense, and by deterring others from imitating him.
A criminal prosecution is not concerned in any way with compensation of the injured
individual against whom the crime is committed, and his only part in it is that of an
accuser and a witness for the state. So far as the criminal law is concerned, he will
leave the courtroom empty-handed.
WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (4th ed. 1971); see also 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3; 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS 65 (1859);
COURTNEY S. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 542 (16th ed. 1952); IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 49 (1965).
61. FOUCAULT, supra note 56, at 47.
62. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1751 (West 1984); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). While many states make the murder of certain public officials,
including firemen, an aggravating circumstance to be considered in determining punishment,
only Ohio specifically provides that the assassination of the President of the United States is
such an aggravating circumstance. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(1) (Anderson 1987).
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touched the very person of the prince; and it is the prince-or at
least those to whom he has delegated his force-who seizes upon
the body of the condemned man and displays it marked beatenbroken."3
The specific polity behind the ceremony was intimidation. The general
polity behind it was government by terror.6' The ritual was explicitly
military and it impressed upon all who saw it that punished crime re-
sulted not only in justice, but also in exercise of the sovereign's discre-
tionary power to do acts of violence.65
The French Revolutionaries recognized this power, as did the kings
they deposed. Thus, Taut de la Bouverie, representative of Parisians in
1791, declared to the National Assembly: "There must be terrible spec-
tacles in order to control the people."' 66 Similarly, Mussolini's execra-
tors, who later enjoyed important political posts in Italy,67 also drew
upon this tradition of galvanizing the power relationship by displaying its
ultimate signifier, public violence.68 The execration preserved the battle
63. FOUCAULT, supra note 56, at 48-49.
64. The public execution did not re-establish justice; it re-activated power. In the
seventeenth century, and even in the early eighteenth century, it was not, therefore,
with all its theatre of terror, a lingering hang-over from an earlier age. Its ruthless-
ness, its spectacle, its physical violence, its unbalanced play of forces, its meticulous
ceremonial, its entire apparatus were inscribed in the political functioning of the pe-
nal system.
Ia,
65. One would expect that death penalties have been imposed more frequently during
times of war than during times of peace. This fact, if true, could be explained by a hardening
of emotions during times of fighting, by increased crime rates resulting from social dislocation
and anxiety, by an increase in the rate of treason, and other various factors. However, each of
these possible explanations reinforces the truth of a greater cause: The same sovereign that
goes to war must operate just as strongly on the home front; it has long been believed that lax
domestic morale and standards will result in the international downfall of any nation. See
generally THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Rex Warner trans., 1954). Justice Mar-
shall has noted that "the Civil War halted much of the abolition furor. One historian has said
that '[a]fter the Civil War, men's finer sensibilities, which had once been revolted by the execu-
tion of a fellow being, seemed hardened and blunted."' Furman, 408 U.S. at 338-39 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (quoting Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in
America, 1787-1861, 63 AM. HIST. REv. 23, 33 (1957)).
Wartime espionage in the United States has been more severely punished than peacetime
espionage. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 15 n.21, 45 n.53 (1945). For an impres-
sive survey of Civil War era cases, see TEETERS, supra note 20, at 373-90.
66. ALBERT CAMfJS, REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE 10 (1959).
67. See RICHARD COLLIER, DucE! THE RISE AND FALL OF BENITO MUSsOLINI 420-33
(1971); DOMBROWSKI, supra note 40, at 236-41.
68. Compare Mussolini's execration with-as it is described by Foucault-
the celebrated torture and execution of Massola, which took place at Avignon and
which was one of the first to arouse the indignation of contemporaries. This was an
apparently paradoxical ceremony, since it took place almost entirely after death, and
since justice did little more than deploy its magnificent theatre, the ritual praise of its
force, on a corpse.
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they had won. Concomitantly, the method of execution traditionally has
been more severe for cases of treason than for simple murder.6 9 In the
United States, sovereignty was affirmed by the military, in the necessarily
public execution of Abraham Lincoln's assassins, after the Civil War.7"
That particular execution has been deeply impressed on the nation-not
least through the photographs of Matthew Brady7 l1-for over a century.
Its vestiges remain with us today in the American public execution.
A public execution is the ultimate act of asserting authority by ter-
ror. It is violent and not secret. It is the most extraordinary form of
public violence, at once gritty-real and transcendent in character.72 The
FOUCAULT, supra note 56, at 50-51. After Massola was dead,
the mortis exactor, who had a large knife, then cut his throat, which spattered him
with blood; it was a horrible sight to see; he severed the sinews near the two heels,
and then opened up the belly from which he drew the heart, liver, spleen and lungs,
which he stuck on an iron hook, and cut and dissected into pieces, which he then
stuck on the other hooks as he cut them, as one does with an animal.
Id at 51.
69. JOHN LAURANCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1960). In England,
"[it was asserted, when Sir Roger Casement was sentenced to death in 1917 for treason, that
he must be executed in public, as the Act abolishing public executions did not apply to treason.
In any case, however, the Act of 1887 authorised [sic] Sheriffs to execute any death sentence in
a prison under their jurisdiction." Id. at 26.
70. About 200 spectators and several hundred soldiers attended the execution. REPORT-
ERS OF THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, THE TRIAL OF THE LINCOLN ASSASSINS AND CON-
SPIRATORS AT WASHINGTON. D.C., MAY AND JUNE 1985, FOR THE MURDER OF PRESIDENT
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 208-09 (1865). For photographs, see GuY W. MOORE, THE CASE OF
MRS. SuRRATT: HER CONTROVERSIAL TRIAL AND ExECUTION FOR CONSPIRACY IN THE
LINCOLN ASSASSINATION (1954). A military tribunal tried the conspirators; soldiers executed
them. The Attorney General issued an extraordinary opinion approving of this procedure,
noting that John Wilkes Booth and his associates were not acting out of private malice, but as
public enemies. Attorney General James Sneed, Opinion on the Constitutional Power of the
Military to Try and Execute the Assassins of the President, in THE ASSASSINATION OF PRsI-
DENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS 403-09 (Berm Pitman ed., 1865). "It
is well known that the conspirators... were hanged at Washington, D.C., July 7, 1865. What
is not generally known is the feeling of national hysteria or the speed of imposed justice that
characterized the times and the trial." TEETERS, supra note 20, at 4. One of Mussolini's
execrators, a Communist named Serini, when challenged with the remark that the event was
obscene, replied, "History is made that way-some people must not only die, but die in
shame." COLLIER, supra note 67, at 366.
71. Matthew Brady, an American pioneer photographer, was known for his daguerreo-
types of President Lincoln and the Civil War. THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 353
(William H. Harris et al. eds., 4th ed. 1975).
72. Albert Camus tells the story of his father, an upstanding citizen who was so outraged
by a particular murder that he decided to attend the execution with a great crowd of
spectators:
He never told what he saw that morning. My mother could only report that he
rushed wildly into the house, refused to speak, threw himself on the bed, and sud-
denly began to vomit. He had just discovered the reality concealed beneath the great
formulas that ordinarily serve to mask it. Instead of thinking of the [prisoner's vic-
tims], he could recall only the trembling body he had seen thrown on the board to
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application of public violence by modem politicians surely is no less so-
phisticated than it was by their eighteenth-century counterparts.
Focus upon the modem totalitarian. The operative, necessary fea-
ture of fascist movements has been "the public display of a potential for
organized violence" focused on a target, generally a racial target-
although a member of the "criminal" or "sociopathic" class will do al-
most as well. What is perhaps the predominant theory of fascist power
has held, not surprisingly, that "[c]onstant resort to violence arises from
the very nature of fascist movements, which weld together diverse social
strata ... [by their] stress on action and violence [that] tends both to
impose some form of unity,... and to temper it for the bigger confronta-
tions to which its leaders aspire."73 No one can match the expressive
force of formalized or statutory violence with anything short of violent
rebellion; public execution is paramount in the hierarchy of public polit-
ical expression. Thus, in politically centralized and hierarchical commu-
nities, the public executioner has a monopoly on the most potent form of
public political expression.74
The ideological inspiration for European fascism, found in the
works of Gobineau, Nietzsche, and Sorel, exhorts action through vio-
lence.75 Sorel's important book, Reflections on Violence, urged gaining
authority through violence rather than waiting for changes in social and
economic conditions.76 Building on this thesis, Mussolini declared: "It
is to Sorel that I owe most."77 Gobineau's Essay on the Inequality of
Human Races advocated organizing in terms of the body rather than the
spirit.7" This highly influential work has been "a basic source of Fascist
opposition to the sentimental humanism of an earlier day."79 Gobineau's
core lesson was that power should be founded not on universal values of
human dignity, but upon specific factors of biology: race, nation, and
have its head chopped off.... This ritual act must indeed be horrible if it can subvert
the indignation of a simple, upright man; if the punishment which he regarded as
deserved a hundred times over had no other effect on him than to turn his stomach.
When the supreme act of justice merely nauseates the honest citizen it is supposed to
protect, it seems difficult to maintain that this act is intended... to confer a greater
degree of peace and order upon the city.
CAMUS, supra note 66, at 5.
73. Alex Callinicos, Repressive Toleration Revisited: Mill, Marcuse, Maclntyre, in AS-
PECTS OF TOLERATION 53, 69-70 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1985) (footnote
omitted).
74. Cf Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (regulations restricting politicians from
campaigning on military bases do not offend the First Amendment).




79. Id. at 33.
caste. One must justify aspirati6ns to total control by biological consid-
erations, defining "order" by the coincidence of political and selected bi-
ological realities. One must gain power by violence, for violence is "the
highest or, at any rate, the most obvious form of the social energy and
the will to power which create history."8 °
The popular violent spectacle is a magnetic basis for the fascists' cult
of charismatic leadership. Modem leaders like Mussolini, Hitler, Eva
Peron, and Degrelle concentrated power by focusing the public's emotion
and affection on themselves. The fascists employ terror in a passion for
unanimity. Although fascism is distinctly anti-rational in ideology and
appeal, fascists use the tools and by-products of rationality to be efficient.
In so doing, fascists employ a highly rational understanding of the power
of the irrational. The deliberate use of the plebiscite, for instance, has
been an important feature of such totalitarians as Napoleon and Crom-
well, the Nazis and the Soviets."1
The fascists appeal to irrationality by applying a particular aesthetic.
Public violence, particularly public death, has extraordinary powers of
suggestion, extending beyond the act itself. In recent years, artists, writ-
ers, and filmmakers have used this aesthetic to re-elaborate Nazism. This
appeal extends to many supermarket checkout lines, where several swas-
tikas may meet consumers of paperback novels.8" An understanding of
the aesthetic is important, because any analysis of fascism must look to
the non-rational and to the irrational; it must extend beyond ideology,
economics, and sociology. Too often our understanding of human expe-
rience has been limited by explanatory categories concerning the utilita-
rian, materialistic, or intellectual rationality of motives. This limitation
is especially true of American legal analysis,8" which is still conducted as
though people had no feelings, no emotional ties, no bodily senses. Rec-
ognizing the problem, Saul Friedlander, one of our leading historians of
the Holocaust has determined that "Nazism's attraction lay less in any
explicit ideology than in the power of emotion, images, and phantasms.
Both left and right were susceptible to them-at least during that crucial
period from around 1930 until the German defeats midway through the
80. Id at 34 (emphasis in original).
81. CARL J. FRIEDRICH & ZBIGNIEW K. BRzEzINsI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP
AND AUTOCRACY 161-69 (2d ed. 1966).
82. See generally MATEi CALINESCU, FACES OF MODERNrrY (1977).
83. See Joseph Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053 (1968);
Allan A. Stone, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence: Revisited, 10 AM. CiUM. L. REv. 357
(1972); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytical Jurisprudence: A Common Language for Bab-
ylon, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1331 (1965); 7 THE WRrrNGS OF ANNA FREUD: PROBLEMS OF
PSYCHOANALYTIC TRAINING, DIAGNOSIS, AND THE TECHNIQUE OF THERAPY, 1966-1970, at
258 (1971).
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war."
84
The power of which Friedlander spoke has influenced pop-cultural
representations of Nazism. They no longer take a detached and condem-
natory view of Nazism, but rather provide a more empathetic (though
not necessarily sympathetic) perspective on it. Through this empathy,
the crowd experiences order amidst the chaos. Friedlander's classic anal-
ysis finds "the beginnings of a frisson, the presence of a desire, the work-
ings of an exorcism." 5 This is what happens in the new discourse:
At the heart of each of the zones of meanings, profound contradic-
tions emerge: an aesthetic frisson, created by the opposition be-
tween the harmony of kitsch 6 ... and the constant evocation of
themes of death and destruction; a desire aroused by the eroticiza-
tion of the Leader as Everyman, close to everyone's heart and a
total power of destruction flung into nothingness; an exorcism, fi-
nally, whose total endeavor, in the past and in the present, in-in
the face of Nazi criminality and extermination policies-to main-
tain distance by means of language, to affirm the existence of an-
other reality by inverting the signs of this one, and finally to
appease by showing that all the chaos and horror is, after all, co-
herent and explainable.87
Thus pop-cultural representations of Nazism, like Nazism itself, trans-
form ordinary human longings for aesthetic balance and beauty into a
cult of death.
Representing death-especially horrible death-with kitsch is a way
of making death sensible, a way of creating order from chaos. The juxta-
position of kitsch and death represents "the foundation of a certain reli-
84. SAUL FRIEDLANDER, REFLECTIONS OF NAzISM: AN ESSAY ON KITSCH AND
DEATH 14 (1984).
85. Id. at 18.
86. Kitsch, in this context, is explained as follows: "There is a kitsch of death. For exam-
ple,... any child in a school yard who mimics the death of a cowboy or Indian, cop or thief,
Mafioso or incorruptible gives a kitsch performance of death." Id. at 18.
In ordinary kitsch there is an equivalence between the representation of reality
and what could exist in reality: Lovers actually do lie under a fir tree like two turtle-
doves; a cottage from whose chimney a thin tendril of smoke rises could indeed har-
bor a happy family; a Swiss landscape does resemble a picture postcard. But faced
with a kitsch representation of death, everyone knows that here two contradictory
elements are amalgamated: on the one hand, an appeal to harmony, to emotional
communion at the simplest and most immediate level [kitsch]; on the other, solitude
and terror [death].... [O]ne of the characteristics of kitsch is precisely the neutrali-
zation of 'extreme situations,' particularly death, by turning them into some senti-
mental idyll .... Basically, at the level of individual experience, kitsch and death
remain incompatible. The juxtaposition of these two contradictory elements repre-
sents the foundation of a certain religious aesthetic, and, in my opinion, the bedrock
of Nazi aesthetics as well as the new evocation of Nazism.
Id at 26-27.
87. Id. at 18-19.
gious aesthetic, and... the bedrock of Nazi aesthetics as well as the new
evocation of Nazism."88 And yet, a death by execution should be under-
stood as anything but orderly. It is a messy struggle. Though the pun-
isher draws veracity from imposing order, such order is inherently
impossible.89
The Nazi extermination camps, with their bureaucratic orderliness,
drew millions to their deaths while millions of others stood by with a
certain horrible glee. The ceremony of public execution, with its mask of
stately order, does not work at all differently. Death, and nostalgia that
looks backward to the lost pre-modern world, are "particularly powerful
88. Id at 27. See supra, note 86, for an explanation of why kitsch and death are incom-
patible in a logical world of rational discourse.
89. An amicus brief filed in Furman by several former prison wardens who witnessed
executions offered detailed descriptions:
The hanging itself, whether the prisoner is dropped through a trap, after climbing the
traditional 13 steps, or whether he is Jerked from the floor after having been
strapped, blackcapped and noosed, is a very gruesome spectacle. Generally, three
men in a small enclosure on the gallows cut taut strings, one of these springs the trap,
while the other two are attached to dummy ropes. This somewhat bizarre procedure
is designed to give the three officers some feeling of non-responsibility for the death
of their victim. The prison guard stands at the feet of the hanged person and holds
his body steady, because during the first few minutes there is usually considerable
struggling by the condemned man as he tries to breathe. Sometimes his neck does
not break and he strangles to death. His eyes pop almost out of his head, his tongue
swells and protrudes from his mouth, his neck may be broken and the rope may rip
large portions of his skin and flesh from the side of his face on which the noose is set.
He urinates, he defecates, and his droppings fall to the floor while the witnesses look
on. In almost all executions at least one witness faints or has to be helped out of the
witness room. The prisoner remains dangling from the end of the rope from 8 to 14
minutes before the attending doctor climbs up a small ladder and listens to his heart-
beat (sic] with a stethoscope and pronounces him dead.
In States which practice electrocution, the body of the condemned man is pre-
pared beforehand with a fastening, and one of his pants legs is split in order that an
electric plate can be placed against his leg. When the electrocutioner throws the
switch that propels the electric current through the body of the prisoner, the victim
cringes from torture, his flesh swells and his skin stretches to the point of breaking.
He defecates, he urinates, his tongue swells and his eyes pop out. In some cases his
eyeballs rest on his cheeks; his flesh is burned and smells of cooked meat; sometimes
a spiral of smoke rises from his head.
When a firing squad is the method of death, several rifle shots are fired, all but
one of which is effective. As in the case of hanging and electrocution, shooting disfig-
ures the body of the prisoner.
In administering death by lethal gas .... [the prisoner] is dressed in blue jeans
and a white shirt as other garments might hold a pocket of gas. He is accompanied
10 or 12 steps to the gas chamber by two officers, quickly strapped in a metal chair, a
stethoscope applied and the door sealed. Out of sight of the witnesses the execu-
tioner, on a signal from the warden, presses the lever which allows cyanide gas eggs
to mix with the distilled water and sulfuric acid. At first there is extreme evidence of
horror, pain and strangling. The prisoner's eyes pop, they turn purple, they drool.
Soon the prisoner is unconscious. It is a horrible sight, at which witnesses frequently
faint.
Amicus brief filed on behalf of James V. Bennett, at 12-14, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (Nos. 69-5003, 69-5030, 69-5031).
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in fascism in general and in Nazism in particular."'  So are death and
nostalgia the essence of the modem public execution, which looks back-
ward to primitive urges for revenge, to eye-for-an-eye justice, the days of
yore when we did see spies hanged, kings decapitated, witches burned;
and rapists gibbeted. Here is a kind of negative transcendence, a blinding
spectacle of destruction. Longings for the aesthetic balance of justice
have produced a similar cult of death among victims' rights movements
in our own day.91
The public execution gives the public its momentary hero and its
momentary God. The hero is the condemned man.92 The God is the
governor who signs the death warrant, proclaiming to his constituents
that justice is served. People ascribe collective parental power to their
leaders. The sovereign's power is mythologized.
Even more, the power is eroticized. "Power carries an erotic
charge," says Foucault:
This poses a historical problem: How could Nazism, which was
represented by lamentable, shabby, puritan young men, by a spe-
cies of Victorian spinsters, have become everywhere today-in
France, in Germany, in the United States-in all the pornographic
literature of the whole world, the absolute reference of eroticism?
All the shoddiest aspects of the erotic imagination are now put
under the sign of Nazism.93
"Nazism," he says, "never gave a pound of butter to the people, it never
gave anything but power."94
Today, even in the democratic American state, officials proclaim a
death penalty, debate it eternally, enforce it with great ceremony, and
occasionally grant a reprieve, filling the heart of the body public with
relief. Sometimes officials enforce the execution, showing awesome
power and the discretionary capacity to give or withhold love.95 When
90. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 84, at 39.
91. See amicus brief filed in support of the state, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
(No. 86-5020) (victim impact statement in capital sentencing in violation of Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause).
92. See, e-g., EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDwARD LIVINGSTON
ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 44 (1873); 2 CORRESPONDENT 93-94 (1873).
93. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 84, at 74 (quoting interview with Michel Foucault, CA-
HIERS DU CINEMA, July-Aug. 1974, at 10).
94. Id.
95. The Supreme Court, per Justice Stewart, quoted: "The division [between proponents
and opponents of hanging] is not between rich and poor, highbrow and lowbrow, Christians
and atheists; it is between those who have charity and those who have not .... " Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.17 (1968) (quoting ARTHUR KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON
HANGING 166-67 (1956)). See also Richard E. Meyer, Governor Calls Practice "Anti-God"
Anaya Spares All Inmates on New Mexico Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1986, at 1 (New
Mexico Governor Toney Anaya commuted state's entire Death Row to life imprisonment.
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they do the latter publicly, the public perceives the eroticization of lead-
ership. "The twentieth century has experienced the gross magnification
of political and personal irrationality correlative to the exponential incre-
ment in the power of modem technology. '96 In contemporary American
society, one may find evidence that attachment to distant leaders has in-
creased as family structures break down and the level of human tran-
sience increases. 97 A gang leader named Daniel Thomas uttered a simple
truth when he was taken to his Florida execution in 1986:
"We are human tools and political pawns for human sacrifice,"
Thomas said, blaming his death on "politicians seeking the highest
office in the state."
"Governor Bob Graham has opened the doors to a new wave
of politicking that says the best way to win political races is to
boast that 'I'll carry out the execution of every prisoner on Flor-
ida's death row,'" said Thomas.98
The gang leader could perceive how state officials trade on the irrational
demands of sadism.99  And clearly such officials do have a
"Prisoners and their families thanked him for his mercy, but most other reaction was sharply
negative .... Anaya's commutation won praise from church groups .... Anaya, a Roman
Catholic, stood firm on his promise to stay executions. 'I believe that only God can give life
and only he can take it away,' he said. 'For the state to presume to kill is barbarous, as
murderous as the common criminal.' ")
96. LOEWENBERO, supra note 53, at 242.
97. See generally id.
98. Denny Hamilton, Murderer-Rapist Lays Execution to 'Politicians Seeking Office, 'L.A.
DAILY J., Apr. 16, 1986, at 5.
99. If officials avoid these pressures, the price can be high.
Former Gov. Edmund G. 'Pat' Brown revealed Wednesday that he almost resigned
as California's chief executive in 1980 after he granted a 60-day reprieve to 'Redlight
Bandit' Caryl Chessman. At a reunion luncheon with Capitol reporters, Brown re-
called that after he delayed Chessman's execution he was booed everywhere he went.
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 11, 1985; see also ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 19, 1986 (Leroy
Collins, governor of Florida, 1955-1961, writes, "The death penalty is Florida's gutter of
shame.").
So long as executions in public were allowed in England, these sordid, sadistic per-
formances were apparently looked upon by the majority of spectators as entertain-
ments on a par with the modem boxing contest or football match. From far and
near, the public in its thousands flocked to the places of execution, the wealthy pay-
ing high prices for positions ensuring a particularly intimate view of the execution.
Indeed, many wealthy sadists made a practice of witnessing every execution possible.
One such was Horace Walpole's close friend, George Selwyn, of whom it was said
that his greatest pleasure in life was to see a man put to death. Another noted char-
acter who took pleasure in witnessing the death throes of criminals was Samuel John-
son's biographer, Boswell. He rarely missed an execution at Newgate.
It is a noteworthy point, which has been remarked upon again and again by
contemporary historians, that in those days when social distinctions were in all cir-
cumstances of normalcy most sharply defined and clearly drawn, at these spectacles
of torture and cruelty such distinctions were, for the moment, totally forgotten.
Peers and peasants mixed with each other on terms of equality; they exchanged jests
and jokes with the greatest of good humor. This, more perhaps than anything else,
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constituency. 100
Nazi power expressed a flow of ideas, emotions, and phantasms that
are kept separate in all liberal Western societies.10 1 And the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment,"e2 should
separate this flow, for
[w]e know that the dream of total power is always present, though
dammed up, repressed by the Law. Also constant is the tempta-
tion to break the Law, even at the risk of destruction. With this
difference-which perhaps tempers, or on the contrary exacer-
bates, the apocalyptic dreams: This time, to reach for total power
is to assure oneself, and all of mankind as well, of being engulfed in
total and irremediable destruction.
103
If exposure to destruction and death causes emotion to become ca-
thartic at one level, it deadens emotion at another, making us more will-
ing to accept death as a matter of course, replacing outrage with a
soothing banality. Social scientists have concluded that public execution
brutalizes the community, 1°4 especially if conducted locally. "Instead of
instilling respect for life, it prompts disrespect; instead of creating a fear
of violence, it promotes a fascination with it; and ultimately, instead of
deterring violence, it encourages a fatalistic acceptance of it."105 As
early as 1787, Dr. Benjamin Rush expressed the effects of public
executions:
Now, as the distress which the criminals suffer, is the effect of a
law of the state, which cannot be resisted, the sympathy of the
spectator is rendered abortive, and returns empty to the bosom in
which it was awakened .... [This sympathy] is the vicegerent of
indicates how great an effect on the emotions had these inhuman, revolting and bar-
baric spectacles.
GEORGE R. ScorT, THE HISTORY OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 226-27 (1938).
See also MAILER, supra note 2, at 952 (describing spectators at Gary Gilmore's execution:
"Any cop or bureaucrat who had a little pull had gotten in.... Here were all these Sheriffs and
County Troopers Stanger had never seen before, come right out of the woodwork-how could
you be respected in your profession if you weren't here.").
100. Social scientists have found that "persons who favor the death penalty are more likely
than opponents to score high on various psychological measures of authoritarianism, dogma-
tism and conservatism in legal, social, and political views." Nell Vidmar & Phoebe C. Ells-
worth, Research on Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 68, 78-79 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (footnote omitted). They are also
"more likely to be willing to endorse attitude statements supporting such things as discrimina-
tion against minority groups, restrictions on civil liberties, and violence for achieving social
goals" than are persons opposed or neutral to the death penalty. Id. at 79.
101. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 84, at 134.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
103. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 84, at 136.




the divine benevolence in our world. It is intended to bind up all
the wounds which sin and death have made among mankind....
If such are the advantages of [sympathetic] sensibility, now
what must be the consequences to society of extirpating or weaken-
ing it in the human breast? But public punishments are calculated
to produce this effect.
106
He concluded that public punishments make room in the heart to accept
evil:
The principle of sympathy, after being opposed by the law of the
state, which forbids it to relieve the distress it commiserates, will
cease to act altogether; and, from this defect of action, and the
habit arising from it, [sympathy] will soon lose its place in the
human breast. Misery of every kind will then be contemplated
without emotion or sympathy.... [A]nd what is worse than all,
when the centennial of our moral faculty is removed, there is noth-
ing to guard the mind from the inroads of every positive vice."
For this reason, asserted Rush, the Jewish law commands against specta-
tors in these words: "[T]hine eye shall not pity him."10
The contrary claim of death penalty abolitionists that public execu-
tions will disgust people and move them to oppose the death penalty is
short-sighted because, if Rush is correct, over time most witnesses would
become inured and jaded. Moreover, the claim is intellectually dishon-
est, because if the abolitionists are correct, then they would have to aban-
don their principal moral argument against the death penalty-that it
has no deterrent impact. Detailed research in the United States and
other countries has provided no evidence that the death penalty deters
crime more effectively than other punishments." 9
IV. The Structural Response of Law: Values of the Eighth
Amendment
This Article has suggested that totalitarianism and human degrada-
tion describe, respectively, the purpose and effect of public executions.
Under any reasonable interpretation of our common history and Consti-
tution, totalitarianism and human degradation are two undesirable char-
acteristics of political and social life. The values that find expression in
the Eighth Amendment may serve as a comfortable starting point for this
simple assertion. The only Supreme Court Justice ever to mention the
106. RusH, supra note 8, at 5.
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id. The word "pity" poetically suggests viewing (by the "eye"); that viewing will
result in a hardening of the heart.
109. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY
162-66 (1987).
Winter 19921
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
problem of public executions was examining the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause when he wrote: "No longer does our society counte-
nance the spectacle of public executions, once thought desirable as a
deterrent to criminal behavior by others. Today we reject public execu-
tions as debasing and brutalizing to us all."'110 The Eighth Amendment
is also a convenient starting point because it explicitly limits punishment,
which has been deemed necessary for social ordering.
The Supreme Court has long held that the test for prohibiting pun-
ishment as cruel and unusual "may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice." '' The test is one of social
morality and conscience. The appropriate standard for "cruel and unu-
sual" must transcend the concerns of the prisoner, since it is axiological
to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that the Clause serves not only the
prisoner, but society's attempt at humane self-governance. Although the
language of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause historically has
been invoked to address personal due process claims, the Clause should
be understood to have a life of its own, embracing matters of social con-
cern. The Clause is useful in examining a particular structure of natural
law values: to protect the workings of a democracy based on rational
discourse and human dignity; and to keep society from degrading, debas-
ing, and brutalizing itself." 2
110. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 297 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Bren-
nan made the point in passing to support an argument against capital punishment, apparently
because all courts would accept without dispute the unconstitutionality of public executions.
111. United States v. Weems, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
112. I am suggesting that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has three aspects.
The first aspect embodies a personal or private right: to protect the prisoner from certain
hardships. This is a requirement of personal due process, and thus applicable to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463
(1947); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The second and third aspects em-
body public rights: the right to protect the workings of democracy based on rational discourse,
and the right to protect society from degrading, debasing, and brutalizing itself. The ban on
cruel and unusual punishment, thus far applicable to the states, cannot be bifurcated according
to its private and public aspects. If one aspect of the Eighth Amendment applies, then all
aspects of it must apply. To hold otherwise would require a paradoxical jurisprudence.
The public aspects must apply just as do the private aspects. The Court's approach in
applying the incorporation doctrine has been to incorporate those amendments, including the
Eighth Amendment, that embody "'principle[s] of justice so rooted in the tradition and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' and thus 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."' LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 773
(2d ed. 1988) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)). Avoid-
ing totalitarianism and human degradation appears to be a goal that is "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." The Court's decisions drawing on the Bill of Rights to restrict state action
have not been limited to personal procedural matters; the Court has repeatedly applied the Bill
of Rights to substantive law ("the permissible substance of state law," id.). See, eg., Chicago
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (just compensation); Grosjean v. American
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There is no statement in the Constitution about why cruel and unu-
sual punishment cannot be inflicted. It is prohibited, simply and plainly.
The values that undergird the Eighth Amendment are not susceptible to
a simple linguistic decoding. One should look, then, for a pattern in the
holdings in order to discover a positive structure that builds on values of
human dignity. 13 We begin with the 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles,114 in
which Chief Justice Warren found that "[t]he basic concept underlying
the [Clause] is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has
the power to punish, the [Clause] stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards." ' 5 The Court held
that it is cruel and unusual punishment to expatriate a soldier for desert-
ing the armed services during war. Beyond its literal language, the deci-
sion's very approach-searching for the limits of civilized standards-
implicitly recognizes human dignity, enunciating the profoundly social
quality of the Eighth Amendment. Both the words and the holding
against expatriation strongly imply a concern that society, viewed
through the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, must not dis-
integrate itself into a mere amalgamation of lone wolves (even lone
wolves with personal rights).
Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion declared that the Eighth
Amendment will not allow a citizen to be deprived of citizenship merely
because the citizen shirked a duty of citizenship.1 6 Yet something more
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (freedom of press); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(freedom of assembly); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association); Stan-
ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene literature).
Obviously, the Constitution must be concerned not only with the rights of the individual
but with the rights of society. That is why the Constitution is in the nature of a social com-
pact. See eg., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) ("In addition to the general concern
that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal
interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to,
the interests of the accused."); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 130-
33 (1974).
In the context of the Sixth Amendment, Justice Black has observed that "the people as a
whole, or as they are usually called, 'society' or 'the state,' have as much right to an impartial
jury as do criminal defendants. This Court itself has made that quite clear: 'It is to be
remembered that such impartiality requires not only freedom from any bias against the ac-
cused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the
scales are to be evenly held.'" Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 535 (1968) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
113. My approach is not to deconstruct a system of decision by tossing to the side the
values it upholds. Such a method, while entertaining, seems incompatible with a constructive
approach to society. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177
(1985); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
114. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
115. Id. at 100.
116. Id at 92.
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than the rights of prisoner Albert Trop was at stake: The values of a
civilized society. The Court could not have considered expatriation dis-
proportionately severe in relation to the gravity of the crime, since war-
time desertion like Trop's was punishable by death.117 Similarly, a court
could not impose a punishment of torture on a capital offender who, as a
personal matter, might very well prefer it to a punishment of death.
"[T]he [constitutionally permissible] existence of the death penalty is not
a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death
within the limit of its imagination."11
The structure of civilized society is the issue. Expatriation results in
the specter of the individual who has lost the ability to have rights. 1 9 It
results in the spectacle of a nation so uncivilized or socially unstructured
that it punishes its citizens by thrusting them into the open world in a
manner unacceptable to the international community of nations. 120 Trop
suggests that in asking whether social values are degraded by the punish-
ment, the Court is not merely testing some larger principle; it is address-
ing the ultimate value at stake. Indeed, whether punishments are "cruel
and unusual" constitutionally tests whether society has fallen from the
human dignity essential to competent democratic government.
We should look backwards from Trop to see how the Eighth
Amendment developed its meaning. 21 In 1878, the Court approved a
Utah territorial statute that authorized the death penalty for first-degree
murder.' 22 The Court examined prisoner Wilkerson's only objection,
that where the mode of execution is not specified by statute, no court is
entitled on its own authority to pass a sentence of death. 123 The sentenc-
ing court had ordered that Wilkerson be publicly shot. -124 The prisoner
raised no objection to this public mode as cruel and unusual, nor did the
Supreme Court sua sponte address itself to the issue. Rather, the Court
decided only that the Eighth Amendment is limited in scope to punish-
ments like torture, that are unnecessarily cruel. "'25 The Court defined
117. Id. at 99. The dissenters apparently understood "Cruel and Unusual" to include only
those punishments that were disproportionately excessive. Id at 124-25.
118. Id. at 99.
119. Id. at 102.
120. Id ; see Steven A. Blum, Intervention for the Purpose of Restoring Anarchy with Public
Order: Trends Toward a Developing Norm, 11 ILSA J. INt'L L. 1 (1987).
121. See MARK BLOCH, THE HIsToRIAN's CRAFr 45-46 (1953) (The "prudently retrogres-
sive" method of looking at the outcome first, and then tracking down the beginnings or
"causes" of the phenomenon).
122. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878).
123. Id. at 136-37.
124. Id. at 130.
125. Id. at 136.
PUBLIC EXECUTIONS
cruelty by historical reference. It looked to the custom of war, to mili-
tary laws, to rules prevailing in other countries, and to the common
law.126 Execution by public shooting was traditionally permissible; it did
not violate the Eighth Amendment, so the sentencing court had author-
ity to prescribe the mode of death.
From Wilkerson, the Court moved forward to In re Kemmler,127 a
case for the beginnings of modernism. Kemmler held that death by elec-
trocution was constitutionally permissible. 12 ' This new penalty was the
result of a concerted effort by New York's governor and legislature to
provide a means for execution less barbarous than hanging.'2 9 Resting
on Wilkerson, the Court declared torture impermissible, but took an im-
portant step further when it said that "[p]unishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous-something more than
the mere extinguishment of life."' 3 ° The mode of execution thus became
an issue of constitutional law rather than common law. The Court took
great care to note the findings of the state courts, focusing on the state's
intent, when it declared "that it was for the legislature to say in what
manner sentence of death should be executed; that this act was passed in
the effort to devise a more humane method of reaching the result; ...
[and that] the legislature had attained by the act the object [it] had in
view by its passage."'' The Court here emphasized the state's intent to
be more humane. It saw that the term "cruel" does not imply hurt as
much as sadism; that "cruel" describes the punisher more than it does
the punishment; and that as a constitutional matter, the punishment is
relevant principally insofar as it manifests the intent or the feeling of the
punisher. This conclusion also follows from the postulate that constitu-
tions are plans for the living (the punishers), not for the dead (the
punished).
A generation later, in 1910, the Court's cruel and unusual punish-
ment doctrine took on a view of the social values at stake that was consis-
tent with Kemmler but more powerfully stated." 2 Paul Weems, a U.S.
Government official in the Philippines, was convicted of falsifying docu-
ments. Weems was sentenced to the draconian term of fifteen years of
126. Id. at 133-36.
127. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
128. Id at 437, 449.
129. Id. at 445.
130. Id at 447.
131. Id
132. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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"labor for the benefit of the State. [He] shall always carry a chain on his
ankle, hanging from the wrists; [he] shall be employed at hard and pain-
ful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without the
institution." 133 The Supreme Court found that
No circumstance of degradation is omitted. It may be that even
the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must bear a chain night and
day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard labor. What pain-
ful labor may mean we have no exact measure. It must be some-
thing more than hard labor. It may be hard labor pressed to the
point of pain.
134
The Court held that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense."1 35 Citing the
President's report on the Philippines, the Court reasoned that there are
"certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essen-
tial to the preservation of those great principles of liberty and law."
1 36
This vision of disparate sentencing extended the Clause's meaning.
It recognized that the constitutional prohibition has extraordinary struc-
tural importance as a broad limitation on government, extending beyond
the imposition of what is literally "cruel" and what is literally "unusual"
to prohibit the tools of totalitarianism. While torture was clearly wrong,
said the Court, "We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty
being exercised through other forms of punishment was overlooked. We
say 'coercive cruelty,' because... [c]ruelty might become an instrument
of tyranny; of zeal for a purpose, either honest or sinister."1 37 The Court
looked to the potential results of cruelty, particularly of penalties that
require more than is essential adequately to punish the crime.
The Framers' objective, said the Court, was to ensure that the kind
of abuses of power that took place under the Stuart monarchies would
not recur. The Court related Justice Story's observation that the Eighth
Amendment was deliberately copied from England's Bill of Rights of
1688 and "adopted as an admonition to all departments of the national
government, to warn them against such violent proceedings as had taken
133. Id. at 364. The Supreme Court quoted the following language, which had been used
by the sentencing court to justify its punishment:
"[I]n public documents the law takes into consideration not only private interests,
but also the interests of the community... to protect the interests of society by the
most strict faithfulness on the part of a public official in the administration of the
office intrusted to him," and thereby fulfill the "responsibility of the State to the
community for the official or public documents under the safeguard of the state."
Id. at 363.
134. Id. at 366.
135. Id. at 367.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 373.
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place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of [the] Stuarts."' 38 Yet
the Court assured us that we need not confine "cruel and unusual" to
only those methods of terror used by the Stuarts. If in the modem age
we see evils and punishments that have no precedent, we may condemn
them. If government officials devise novel uses for common law punish-
ments to practice authoritarian terror, these officials would be stopped.
The Court continued:
Patrick Henry said that there was danger in the adoption of the
Constitution without a Bill of Rights .... Henry and those who
believed, as he did would take no chances. Their predominant
political impulse was distrust of power[,] and they insisted on con-
stitutional limitations against its abuse. But surely they intended
more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of
practice with the Stuarts. Surely, their jealousy of power had a
saner justification than that. They were men of action, practical
and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have
come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other
than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation.'
The body in pain and the personal right of a particular prisoner are not
the only issues at stake. To limit the Eighth Amendment to protecting
something utterly personal is to disregard the value of social health and,
ultimately, political prophylaxis to safeguard that health. While the evil
potential of mental or psychological structures remains constant
throughout the generations, the historical conditions under which the
evil operates cannot precisely repeat themselves."4 It became axiological
to the Justices that the Framers believed that
power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the
clause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its
advocates we cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only
practices like [those of] the Stuarts, or to prevent only an exact
repetition of history. 141
In its sweeping structural approach, the Weems Court cited Chief
Justice Marshall and several constitutional theorists to set out what must
inhere in the Eighth Amendment. 42 The Court declared that
[1legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not,
138. Ma at 371-72 (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, ON THE CONsTrruTION § 1903 (5th ed. 1891)).
139. Id at 372.
140. LOEWENBERG, supra note 53, at 22.
141. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
142. The Court cited Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1873), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1823), to make the point that structural reasoning
is the appropriate means to understand the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and
pointed out that "[t]here are many illustrations of resistance to narrow constructions of the
grants of power to the national government." Weems, 217 U.S. at 374.
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therefore, be necessarily confirmed to the form that evil had there-
tofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new con-
ditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is peculiarly true of constitutions.... Under any other rule a
constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be
deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have
little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and life-
less formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.
And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the
Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive
construction. 143
The substratum of this declaration is evident: The Court refers to a so-
cial dynamic, to changes in social life that require changes in social re-
sponse and in government. While the social structure is diachronic, the
structure of the (abstract) individual remains essentially synchronic;
therefore, remedies must be tailored responsively by giving attention to
the social forces at work when any punishment is meted out.1"
After Wilkerson, Kemmler, and Weems, the Court was prepared to
take up the freakish case of Willie Francis, who twice faced the State of
Louisiana's electric chair. (The first time Francis sat in the chair it mal-
functioned and he remained alive.) Francis sought a writ on the grounds
that facing imminent death twice would constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment.14 In this, the first cruel and unusual punishment case to
reach the Court after the end of World War II, the Court stressed the
accidental nature of the incident and the obvious lack of intent to abuse
governmental power: "As nothing has been brought to our attention to
suggest the contrary, we must and do assume that the state officials car-
ried out their duties under the death warrant in a careful and humane
manner. Accidents happen for which no man is to blame.""'4 Insofar as
one believes that death itself is the penalty, this is an easy case. On the
other hand, if it is true that "it is not death, but dying which is terri-
ble," 47 then forcing Francis to face the chair twice would mean permit-
ting the state to enforce a gratuitous punishment. This would be
unacceptable, for "[o]ur minds rebel against permitting the same sover-
eignty to punish an accused twice for the same offense."14
143. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
144. ROLAND BARTHES, WRrING DEGREE ZERO 9-12 (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith
trans., 1967).
145. Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 461 (1947).
146. Id. at 462.
147. HENRY FIELDING, AMELIA, book III, ch. 4 (1751).
148. Francis, 329 U.S. at 462.
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Thus, it is "unnecessary" and "wanton" infliction of pain that is
prohibited. Indeed, the Court focused on the objective nature of the
Eighth Amendment, discounting subjective or personal due process qual-
ities, when it held, "The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely." '149 Inescapably, the Court must look to the cruelty of the
punisher rather than the hurt suffered by the punished.15 °
The Court did entertain the suggestion that a punishment could
conceivably rise to an undefined "level of hardship" that is unacceptable
from the prisoner's point of view. How that level could be identified
remained an open question. 1' Presumably, the Court was thinking
about the Weems result and analysis. The Court nonetheless stuck to its
predominantly objective focus on the punisher. 152
The four dissenters agreed with the premise that the nexus of deci-
sion should be the standards of civilization,"5 3 but they determined that
no civilized society would countenance the re-application of unsuccess-
fully administered electrocutions. The State's intent remained an impor-
tant issue. But the question became: Intent at what stage of the process?
The dissenters wrote:
If the state officials deliberately and intentionally had placed the
relator in the electric chair five times and, each time, had applied
electric current to his body in a manner not sufficient, until the
final time, to kill him, such a form of torture would rival that of
burning at the stake. Although the failure of the first attempt, in
the present case, was unintended, the reapplication of the electric
current will be intentional. How many deliberate and intentional
reapplications of electric current does it take to produce a cruel,
unusual and unconstitutional punishment? . . . If five attempts
would be "cruel and unusual," it would be difficult to draw the line
149. Id. at 464.
150. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of
the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an element of cruelty to a subsequent execu-
tion. There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain in-
volved in the proposed execution. The situation of the unfortunate victim of this
accident is just as though he had suffered the identical amount of mental anguish and




152. It is not too flippant, I believe, to observe here that the Constitution prohibits "cruel
and unusual punishments" rather than "painful and unusual punishments." Cruelty describes
the punisher; the punished experiences pain.
153. Francis, 329 U.S. at 473 (Burton, J., joined by Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, JJ.,
dissenting).
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between two, three, four and five. 15 4
In essence, the dissenters recognized that governmental intent is often
hard to find until it is too late.
The trend of Eighth Amendment analysis takes us to the two Geor-
gia cases, Furman v. Georgia'55 and Gregg v. Georgia,15 6 which are note-
worthy primarily for their lack of coherence. Without significant
consensus in these opinions, the state of death penalty law became funda-
mentally deficient. Pronouncements of law are legitimate only if they
result in a fair measure of predictability and understanding.'57 Thus the
Court's diffusive application of the Eighth Amendment to the death pen-
alty is less informative to one who seeks to understand an edifice of law
than it is to one who seeks to tear it apart. The Georgia opinions them-
selves surely do not give the law meaning. This is shown by the numer-
ous efforts of legal scholars to create external meaning from texts that
should themselves provide sufficient meaning.
158
Using Furman and Gregg as the most authoritative historical texts
to date, i5 9 however, it is helpful to consider the historical answer to the
problems of totalitarianism and human degradation. England pro-
claimed its answer in its Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the Eighth
Amendment takes its language." The values of the Amendment are
rooted in the common law's experience with totalitarian government.
Justice Douglas's history, in Furman, directed attention to the Bloody
Assizes, the terror marking the interregnum between Charles II and
James II. Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys sentenced hundreds to death "in
154. Id. at 476.
155. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
156. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
157. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 33-44 (1967).
158. See, eg., Robert Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitu-
tion (unpublished paper, presented to the Yale Law School Faculty Workshop, Sept. 29, 1986),
and articles cited therein. The Georgia opinions are mostly dicta. They are best read as au-
thoritative history, disregarding the specific aim toward which they were intended, that is, to
decide the constitutionality of the death penalty. This approach is at once both useful and
distorting: useful because the Justices' reasons should be governing or neutral principles appli-
cable to all cases; distorting because one can easily lose track of the context that gives these
principles life. The test of a good analysis, then, is to remain conscious of context while re-
building a Clause that the Court has nearly deconstructed to death. Judicial understanding of
the Eighth Amendment has disintegrated, particularly as social standards and expectations
have become more heterogenous; our response should be to adapt to this heterogeneity by
explicitly considering form of government, not to abandon the Eighth Amendment's values
altogether.
159. There is, of course, some danger in reading the government's view of history. Cf.
MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING (1980) (people erased from
history by their government).
160. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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the pseudo trials that followed Monmouth's feeble and stupid attempt to
seize the throne.""16 Justice Marshall described the manner in which the
accused rebels were executed:
Mere death was considered much too mild for the villagers and
farms rounded up in these raids. The directions to a high sheriff
were to provide an ax, a cleaver, "a furnace or cauldron to boil
their heads and quarters, and soil to boil therewith, half a bushel to
each traitor, and tar to tar them with, and a sufficient number of
spears and poles to fix their heads and quarters" along the high-
ways. One could have crossed a good part of northern England by
their guidance.' 62
"The story of the Bloody Assizes," wrote Brant, "widely known to
Americans, helped to place constitutional limitations on the crime of
treason and to produce a bar against cruel and unusual punishments."
' 163
And according to Justice Marshall, most historians believe it was the
Bloody Assizes
that finally spurred the adoption of the English Bill of Rights con-
taining the progenitor of our prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. The conduct of Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys at those
trials has been described as an "insane lust for cruelty" which was
"stimulated by orders from the King" (James II). The Assizes re-
ceived wide publicity from Puritan pamphleteers and doubtless
had some influence on the adoption of a cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause.' 64
More recent scholarship suggests that the British reacted not out of
revulsion to torture and egregiously public displays of violence, but
rather in response to the trial of Titus Oates, who was sentenced by a
court of questionable jurisdiction to a disproportionately harsh punish-
ment. 165 But what the British actually intended is significantly less im-
portant than what the American Framers thought the British had
intended. Unquestionably, the Framers had the Bloody Assizes in mind.
Accordingly, Justice Douglas authoritatively concluded,
Those who wrote the Eighth Amendment knew what price their
forebears had paid for a system based, not on equal justice, but on
discrimination. In those days the target was not the blacks or the
poor, but the dissenters, those who opposed absolutism in govern-
ment, who struggled for a parliamentary regime, and who opposed
governments' recurring efforts to foist a particular religion on the




164. Id. at 317 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
165. Anthony F. Grannucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted" The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 862-65 (1969).
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people. But the tool of capital punishment was used with ven-
geance against the opposition and those unpopular with the re-
gime. One cannot read this history without realizing that the
desire for equality was reflected in the ban against "cruel and unu-
sual punishments" contained in the Eighth Amendment.1
66
At the Virginia Convention, where the States debated the provisions of
the Constitution, Patrick Henry eloquently and forthrightly questioned
whether state officials could be trusted to refrain from sadistic impulses
and concluded that "no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on
the virtue of representatives." 167 If "[y]ou let them loose," he suggested,
"you depart from the genius of your country." 168 Although Justice Mar-
shall did not read the statement for this end, it is clear evidence that
Henry's strongest point was that the manner of punishment-punitive or
inquisitorial-has been a factor critical to the form of government which
imposes it.
Physical punishment is perhaps the ultimate sanction imposed by
power. It has the indelible mark of that power; whether the government
belongs to the people, or the people to their government, can be deter-
mined by the mark that punishment leaves on the punished. 169 Patrick
Henry, therefore, said that without the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause,
Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference
to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of
France, Spain, and Germany-of torturing, to extort a confession
of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples
from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you
that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of govern-
ment, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession
166. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOM-
MENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 447 (Jonathon Elliot
ed., 2d ed. 1876) [hereinafter 3 DEBATES]).
168. Id. at 320 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting 3 DEBATES, supra note 167, at 446-48).
169. Raul Hilberg tells of the literal and figurative marks left on Nazi extermination camp
inmates:
Another internal control measure was marking. In the concentration camp, too, the
Jewish inmate had to wear the six-pointed Star of David. In addition, his registration
number was tattooed on his arm. Still another precaution was taken in the form of
daily roll calls which sometimes lasted hours. The roll calls kept track of all prison-
ers and prevented hiding within the camp. The prisoners were not dismissed until
everyone was accounted for, dead or alive. As a last means the Germans also re-
sorted to reprisal, usually a public hanging. They thus sought to frustrate the forma-
tion of an internal resistance movement ....
RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWs 584 (1961). For an interesting
literary interpretation of punishment, see Franz Kafka's The Penal Colony, in which the pun-
ishment was literally inscribed on the prisoner's body.
by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity.
We are then lost and undone.
170
Henry referred not to due process, but to punishment. He was concerned
with the rights of citizens to monitor their government's punishments-
more with the conduct of the punishers than the rights of the punished.
In the debates of the First Congress on the Bill of Rights, only one
statement appears about the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause:
Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, objected to the words "nor cruel
and unusual punishments"; the import of them being too
indefinite.
Mr. LIVERMORE: The clause seems to express a great deal of
humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it
seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What
is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges?
What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to
determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is
sometimes necessary to hang a man; villains, often deserve whip-
ping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to
be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are
cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring
others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be
very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some
security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from
making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.171
This statement has been read to make different points. 172 But one point
is so obvious that no one bothers to mention it: Even the Clause's oppo-
nents such as Livermore agreed that a punishment should not be im-
posed unless it is necessary to achieve justice against guilty prisoners
("villains" who "deserve" punishment).17
Eighth Amendment decisions revolve not around the punished but
around the punisher. Debating the abolition of capital punishment in
England, Lord Chancellor Gardiner reminded the House of Lords that
When we abolished the punishment for treason that you should be
hanged, and then cut down while still alive, and then disembowel-
led while still alive, and then quartered, we did not abolish that
punishment because we sympathized with traitors, but because we
took the view that it was a punishment no longer consistent with
170. Furman, 408 U.S. at 321 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting 3 DEBATES, supra note
167, at 446-48).
171. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789).
172. Furman, 408 U.S. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 262-63 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Hugo A. Bedau, Berger's Defense of the Death Penalty: How Not to Read the
Constitution, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1152, 1159-60 (1983).
173. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789).
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our self respect. 7 4
If the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause should not be viewed
as a personalized protection for the prisoner, it must follow that any citi-
zen should have legal standing to protect himself or herself from being
governed by a state that draws power by inflicting cruel and unusual
punishments; the citizen should be able not to participate in a govern-
mental process that is sadistic, morally draining, or in furtherance of a
banal totalitarian regime. 7 ' This cannot be a question left to the discre-
tion of elected legislatures, because their members benefit from the accre-
tion to power that results from prescribing impermissible punishment.
The courts must tell the legislatures that they may not benefit from dem-
agoguery, sadism, and phantasm.176 Here the case of Gilmore v. Utah
177
174. 268 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 703 (1965), cited in People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d
880, 899 (Cal. 1972). In Anderson, the California Supreme Court concluded
that capital punishment is impermissibly cruel. It degrades and dehumanizes all who
participate in its processes. It is unnecessary to any legitimate goal of the state and is
incompatible with the dignity of man and the judicial process. Our conclusion that
the death penalty may no longer be exacted in California consistently with article I,
section 6, of our Constitution [cruel and unusual punishments] is not grounded in
sympathy for those who would commit crimes of violence, but in concern for the
society that diminishes itself whenever it takes the life of one of its members.
493 P.2d at 899.
175. This is why citizenship, the right to participate in government, is of such value. Any-
one, whether a citizen or not, can bring a due process claim; but only a citizen can direct how
his government will function. Note also the instructive words of Justice Marshall in Furman:
[T]he Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves. The "cruel and
unusual" language limits the avenues through which vengeance can be channeled.
Were this not so, the language would be empty and a return to the rack and other
tortures would be possible in a given case.
Mr. Justice Story wrote that the Eighth Amendment's limitation on punishment
"would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possi-
ble that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atro-
cious conduct."
I would reach an opposite conclusion-that only in a free society would men
recognize their inherent weaknesses and seek to compensate for them by means of a
Constitution.
The history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that retri-
bution for its own sake is improper.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
176. Justice Brennan wrote in Furman:
In short, this Court [in Weems] finally adopted the Framers' view of the Clause
as a "constitutional check" to ensure that "when we come to punishments, no lati-
tude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives." That,
indeed, is the only view consonant with our constitutional form of government. If
the judicial conclusion that a punishment is "cruel and unusual" "depend[ed] upon
virtually unanimous condemnation of the penalty at issue," then, "[l]ike no other
constitutional provision, [the Clause's] only function would be to legitimize advances
already made by other departments and opinions already the conventional wisdom."
We know that the Framers did not envision "so narrow a role for this basic guaranty
of human rights." Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitu-
tional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1782 (1970). The right to be free of cruel and unu-
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is instructive, particularly because Gary Gilmore was publicly executed,
in accordance with his express wishes, by the State of Utah. Gilmore
waived his personal due process rights and refused to appeal his case.
Under the present analysis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, the result was inappropriate. One may not consent to cruel and
unusual punishment. For example, even if given the choice of punish-
ments between torture and death, the prisoner could not choose tor-
ture.17 8 This is true not because the prisoner has any rights at stake, but
because other citizens have a greater right not to live under a government
that sanctions torture as one of its defining structural features. Indeed,
convicted prisoners' rights are negligible, their comfort subject only to
public grace; they are prisoners. Due process becomes irrelevant. The
condemned have "rights" only because their rights are convenient, rela-
tively inexpensive carriers of society's values. It is presumed that prison-
ers have personal stakes quantitatively as great as those held by society,
even though their stakes and society's are by no means qualitatively iden-
tical. Similarly, and by way of analogy, the exclusionary rule concerning
illegal searches and seizures has little to do with the prisoner's inherent
or natural rights; it is merely an inexpensive way to prevent our society
from becoming a police state. It is cheaper and inherently more humane
than introducing a new cycle of punishment against the police officers
who violate the Search and Seizure Clause.
17 9
But Gary Gilmore did not follow the normal presumption of a self-
interested prisoner seeking to further the life-affirming goal to live at all
costs and die (if one must) with dignity and privacy. Gilmore did not
sual punishments, like the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "may not be
submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections." "The very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 268-69 (Brennan, J., concurring).
It is essential, said Justice Brennan, that the judiciary not abdicate to the legislature,
otherwise the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would become "little more than good
advice." Id. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 104 (1958)). But
cf Furman, 408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Whether or not provable, and whether
or not true at all times, in a democracy the legislative Judgment is presumed to embody the
basic standards of decency prevailing in the society. This presumption can only be negated by
unambiguous and compelling evidence of legislative default."). This Article posits the likeli-
hood of such default, both in purpose and in effect, with respect to public executions. See
supra Part III.
177. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
178. See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1387 (1984).
179. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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want to live at all costs. So, too, does the classic martyr defy social "ra-
tionality," '18 or perhaps transcend it.'"'
In the case of Biddle v. Perovich, the prisoner was convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to death. President Taft then commuted the sentence
to life imprisonment. Perovich petitioned for release from prison on the
grounds that the President's order was without his consent and without
legal authority. A unanimous Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes, re-
jected this argument in a sweeping declaration on the nature of punish-
ment. According to Justice Holmes, early cases in England and the
United States held that where "the felon pleads not guilty and waives the
pardon, he shall not be hanged." '182 He continued:
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individ-
ual happening to possess power. It is part of the Constitutional
scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate au-
thority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less
than what the judgment fixed.... Just as the original punishment
would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in
the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare,
not his consent, determines what shall be done." 3
Here the Court admits that punishment is not at all a matter of individ-
ual rights, but of social regulation.
The Gilmore Court faced a systemically similar problem. On De-
cember 3, 1976, Gilmore's mother filed an application for a stay of execu-
tion. She claimed to act as his "next friend" on his behalf. The Court
rejected her application. Chief Justice Burger, concurring, instructed
that Gilmore's mother could have "next friend" standing only if Gilmore
was unable to seek relief on his own behalf. It was inappropriate for her
to assert Gilmore's right because he was capable of filing an appeal if he
wanted one.' 84 This decision was unquestionably correct if only Gil-
more's rights were at stake. (Gilmore waived his appeal, not his rights
under the Eighth Amendment.) However, if a third-party citizen such as
the defendant's mother refuses to consent to the form of government that
180. But see Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312-13 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1979):
The idea that the deliberate decision of one under sentence of death to abandon possi-
ble additional legal avenues of attack on that sentence cannot be a rational decision,
regardless of its motive, suggests that the preservation of one's own life at whatever
cost is the summum bonum, a proposition with respect to which the greatest philoso-
phers and theologians have not agreed and with respect to which the United States
Constitution by its terms does not speak.
181. See generally STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: THE LIFE OF MAR-
TIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1982).
182. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
183. Id.
184. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1976) (Burger, C.J., with Powell, J.,
concurring).
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is the punisher, that is a different issue altogether. The question should
not have been whether Bessie Gilmore could bring an action on behalf of
her son, but whether she could bring an action on her own behalf to
protect her rights as a citizen entitled to live in a society in which cruel
and unusual punishments are forbidden by a Constitution that estab-
lishes principles of humane and rational governance.
185
Chief Justice Burger correctly concluded that the Court was not
presented with a question that would allow it to exercise jurisdiction,
because "[Gary] Gilmore, duly found to be competent by the Utah
courts, has had available meaningful access to this Court and has de-
clined expressly to assert any claim here other than his explicit repudia-
tion of Bessie Gilmore's effort to speak for him as next friend." '186
Similarly, Justices Stevens and Rehnquist were right in concluding that
"a third party has no standing to litigate an Eighth Amendment claim-
or indeed any claim-on his [Gilmore's] behalf." '1 87 The application suf-
fered, in theory, largely because of its form. Bessie Gilmore could have
brought her action as a disinterested citizen unwilling to be subjected to,
or associated with, a government that abused its constitutional grant of
power. Justice Marshall, dissenting, clearly acknowledged the possibility
of this solution when he wrote, "I believe that the Eighth Amendment
not only protects the right of individuals not to be victims of cruel and
unusual punishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest of
society in ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric
punishments." '88 And Justice White, dissenting, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, declared a belief that the protections of the Eighth
Amendment are not waivable. "9 If the rest of the Court understood the
185. Note that I am referring to a non-due-process aspect that exists in what has tradition-
ally been a due-process-oriented amendment. Consider whether: (1) The Eighth Amendment
should not be incorporated under the Due Process Clause; or (2) The Eighth Amendment is
really a direction for how to structure a government, that is applied sub silentio to the states,
uniting their respective forms of government more than the states think they are united. The
second alternative raises a question of federalism, but more importantly, it suggests that the
political question doctrine, which prohibits the federal courts from interfering in the affairs of
a coordinate branch of government, is, as a matter of structure, severely restricted. The Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, while not guaranteeing a republican form of government via
the courts, surely prohibits a fascist government. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849)
(Court refuses to resolve Dorr's Rebellion, which attempted to establish a "people's" govern-
ment in Rhode Island).
186. Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1017 (Burger, C.J., with Powell, J., concurring).
187. Id. (Stevens, J., with Rehnquist, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
189. As Justice Wilkins said in dissent below, there are substantial questions under
Furman v. Georgia .... about the constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute.
Because of Gary Gilmore's purported waiver of his right to challenge the statute,
none of these questions was resolved in the Utah courts. I believe, however, that the
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Eighth Amendment as presented in this Article, they could not object to
Bessie Gilmore's standing, whether or not she was her son's "next
friend." Standing should be available to circumvent the martyr, even if
one must ultimately depend on the subterfuge of taxpayer standing or a
wide range of other arcane doctrines.190
Conclusion
In Furman and Gregg, the Supreme Court moved from a natural
law test of decency to one of public opinion. In both cases, Justices vot-
ing both with the majority and with the minority rested on their concep-
tions of what a democratically represented public would decide. Those
voting against the death penalty postulated that a "fully informed" pub-
lic would abhor executions.191 Particularly in Gregg v. Georgia, the
Court abdicated all responsibility for the death penalty in favor of the
dynamics of popular government, by a legislature or a jury. 191
The Justices have approached the "indefinite" Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause with a synchronic mode of analysis: What is the
current community standard and what does due process require? The
Clause, standing alone, might suggest this approach. But to fully under-
stand the Clause, one must read it diachronically, as supported by the
whole Constitution and its principled foundation of humane dignity and
rational government. Simply because a clause standing alone is "indefi-
nite," it does not follow that the only source of interpretive authority is
the actual instinctive behavior of the body public. It is a constitution, a
coherent plan to constitute a government, that we read; our concern is
consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to
impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 1017-18 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
See also Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 810 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (condemned
person's consent does not authorize constitutionally questionable imposition of death penalty).
One commentator maintains that societal interests in the Eighth Amendment protections af-
forded by post-sentencing appellate review of death sentences are so great that courts should
not permit capital defendants to waive appellate review. Tim Kane, Comment, Capital Pun-
ishment and the Waiver of Sentence Review, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 483, 512-15 (1983).
More recently, on September 13, 1986, the California State Bar Conference of Delegates
passed Substitute Resolution 3-1-86, recommending sponsorship of an amendment to the state
constitution: "The Supreme Court shall review the decision of a court of appeal in all cases
where a judgment of death has been affirmed."
190. See Martin R. Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation as a Sufficient Condition for Un-
constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause-A Case for Consideration: The Utah Firing
Squad, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 438 n.15.
191. See, eg., Furman, 408 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 333 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
192. 428 U.S. 153, 174-77 (1976).
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not merely six random words: "nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted."' 93 To say that the Clause is "indefinite" should only mean that
it draws support from varied sources of authority, which should not be
limited to unrefined public opinion or instinct. These sources include
experience and goals. They also include the dignity of individuals, mea-
sured by the constitutional structure that places high value on privacy, a
realm of individual thought and action that must remain free from gov-
ernmental interference. The Bill of Rights works to restrict government
from operating by means of intimidation or terror, imagery or phantasm;
and the Bill of Rights works to prevent the irrational eroticization of
leadership. The Constitution mandates a government whose source of
authority must remain in the people rather than in incumbents whose
offices are strengthened by public displays of death and destruction.
Since the image of death is most powerful, 194 government and its
officials must take a specifically neutral, private approach to death, with-
out exciting anything like catharsis. 195 The executions must have the
dignity ofgravitas,196 perhaps resting on the classical ideals of the Roman
Republic that the Framers so admired. This approach is consistent with
the First Amendment and its prohibition against restrictions on the free-
dom of speech; the First Amendment encourages government by rational
discourse, and discourages government by phantasm. The Framers knew
nothing of television and film, but the religion clauses of the First
Amendment show that the Framers did know that good democratic gov-
ernment could not survive under the kind of irrationality which results
from a religious aesthetic.
We must return to the inevitable problem of the death penalty itself,
whose constitutional legitimacy this Article has assumed. The analysis
suggests a new question: Will there ever be a true private execution? Or
is the executioner-even a state employee-a member of the public
whom the state permits to manifest a dark wish to see another person
die? This Article presents no satisfactory answer to this question, but it
is a question worth asking.
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
194. District Atty. for Suffolk Dist. v. James Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1291-92 (Mass.
1980) (Liacos, J., concurring).
195. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (1927).
196. Cf ROBERT MIDDLEKAUF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1763-1789, at 133 (1982) (American revolutionary ideology inspired by Cato, the Roman
republican).
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